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Situational assessmentAbstract Coordinated mission decision-making is one of the core steps to effectively exploit the
capabilities of cooperative attack of multiple aircrafts. However, the situational assessment is an
essential base to realize the mission decision-making. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a mission
decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on situational
assessment. We have studied the situational assessment mathematical model based on the
Dempster-Shafer (D-S) evidence theory and the mission decision-making mathematical model
based on the game theory. The proposed mission decision-making method of antagonized airfight
is validated by some simulation examples of a swarm of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)
that carry out the mission of the suppressing of enemy air defenses (SEAD).
 2016 Chinese Society of Aeronautics and Astronautics. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. This is
an open access article under theCCBY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The team of multiple aircrafts has stronger capability than a
single aircraft in detecting the targets, piercing through the
defense systems, and carrying out the attack mission. Each
member of the team can share the information acquired by
any other one and carry out mission of cooperative attackingtargets according to its position in air and the resources of
fighting for a uniform airfight intention. The team of multiple
aircrafts is able to form easily all kinds of vertiginous attack
situation in airfight so that those opposed targets will be con-
fronted with the defending difficulties. Thereby, the fashion
that multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack targets will be the
main pattern in future airfight.
In this paper, the phrase of attacking effect consists of
validity, invalidity and uncertainty. The validity and invalidity
of attacking effect are defined as the advantage acquired by
our aircrafts (or foe’s targets) and the cost paid for achieving
intention by our aircrafts (or foe’s targets) in antagonized air-
fight, respectively. Sensors aboard aircraft affect the attacking
effect of aircraft due to the capability of sensors in detecting,
tracking and identifying target, while weapons aboard aircraftframe-
2 Z. Yao et al.affect the attacking effect due to the capability of weapons in
hitting and destroying target. However, the above capabilities
of sensors and weapons all rest with the distance, azimuth and
pitching between one of our aircrafts and one of foe’s targets.
Accordingly, the fuzzy mapping function of the fighting effect
of sensor and weapon is constructed by selecting the three
position parameters of distance, azimuth and pitching as vari-
ables for establishing the correspondence between the position
parameter and the ability of sensor and weapon. In this paper,
the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) synthesize rules are used for formu-
lating the situational assessment method.
When multiple aircrafts in our team are antagonizing some
foe’s targets simultaneously, one of our aircrafts is able to
either detect and identify the foe’s targets by sensors aboard
the aircraft or receive the information of the foe’s targets by
wireless data link. Therefore, in this paper, we suppose that
our team of multiple aircrafts has known the position and
identity of all foe’s targets and is able to acquire the important
reasoning from the position and identity of foe’s target to the
capability of sensors’ detecting and weapons’ attack, the
defending strategies and the advantage (showed by numerical
value) acquired by selecting a certain defending strategy. If
the above situation of antagonizing airfight is analyzed by
quoting the game theory model, the situation means that our
team has known the opponents and the opponents’ strategies
and cost function. Considering that our opponent is powerful,
we think that our opponent also has known the equivalent
information about our team of multiple aircrafts at least. We
suppose that our team and our opponent simultaneously carry
out action for equality because they all try to be the first actor.
In this paper, the static non-cooperative and nonzero Nash
games are used for formulating the mission decision-making
method.
In recent years, a significant shift of focus has occurred in
the field of autonomous unmanned combat aerial vehicles
(UAVs) as researchers began to investigate problems involving
multiple UAVs rather than single UAV. As a result of this
focus on multiple UAVs, coordination of multiple UAVs has
received significant attention.1–3 Moreover, cooperative sys-
tems are required to operate in an adversary environment
(such as suppressing of enemy air defenses (SEAD)).4,5 Coop-
erative decision-making for multi-UAV or multi-Agent system
is of great interest. A significant amount of current research
activities focuses on a theoretic control framework for dis-
tributed cooperative decision-making for an ensemble of
UAVs, and all the used research methods in this field are sim-
ilar in Refs.6–8 Additional autonomous decision-making focus-
ing on mission planning, target assignment, or operation
management of complex system can be found in Refs.9–14
Solutions to general UAV cooperative decision-making prob-
lems in adversarial environments can be obtained by solving
game problems introduced and implemented in Refs.15–17
Related application information of game theory method
appears in many sources.18,19 A synthetic method for situation
assessment based on fuzzy logic and D-S evidence theory is
proposed in Refs.20,21
This paper develops a mission decision-making algorithm
based on the game model, and then proposes a situational
assessment algorithm based on the D-S evidence synthesize
rules for a swarm of UCAVs in SEAD mission. In Section 2,
a situational assessment algorithm of coordinated airfight is
presented in detail and the D-S evidence theory is introducedPlease cite this article in press as: Yao Z et al. Mission decision-making method of m
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algorithm above. In Section 3, a mission decision-making algo-
rithm is designed by formulating the strategies and cost func-
tion in the game model. Section 3 is based on Section 2.
Section 4 shows an simulation example of a typical mission
performed by a swarm of UCAVs. In Section 5, the simulating
results in Section 4 are analyzed deeply. Section 6 summarizes
the conclusions.
2. Formulating situational assessment based on evidence theory
2.1. Preliminaries
For sustaining the situational assessment algorithms men-
tioned in the previous section, the basic concepts of the D-S
evidence theory are first introduced in the following part.
Let H be a set consisting of all the values that X might be
and an element of set H is not consistent with the other ele-
ments, and then H is called as the discernment frame of X.
Definition 1. Let H be a frame of discernment, and if the
function m : 2H ! ½0; 1 fulfills the following conditions:
(1) mð£Þ ¼ 0
(2)
P
AH
mðAÞ ¼ 1
then m is called as the basic probability assignment on the
frame of discernment H and mðAÞ is called as the basic proba-
bility number of A. mðAÞ denotes the believed degree of A
oneself.
Definition 2. Let H be a frame of discernment, and if the
function m : 2H ! ½0; 1 is the basic probability assignment on
H, then the function Bel : 2H ! ½0; 1 is called as the belief
function and is defined by
BelðAÞ ¼
X
BA
mðBÞð8A  HÞ
where BelðAÞ denotes the believed degree of A including all of
its subsets.
D-S synthesize rules. Let Bel1;Bel2;    ;Beln be the belief func-
tions on the same frame of discernment H;m1;m2; . . . ;mn are
the basic probability assignments correspondingly. If
Bel1  Bel2  . . . Beln is existent and has the basic probabil-
ity assignment m, then
8AH;A–£;A1;A2; . . . ;AnH
mðAÞ¼K
X
A1 ;A2 ;...;AnH
A1\A2\...\An¼A
m1ðA1Þm2ðA2Þ . . .mnðAnÞ
K¼ 1
X
A1 ;A2 ;...;AnH
A1\A2\...\An¼£
m1ðA1Þm2ðA2Þ . . .mnðAnÞ
0
B@
1
CA
1
8>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>:
where K is the middle parameter, and A1, A2, . . ., An are sub-
sets of the discernment frame element A.
The D-S synthesize rules reflect the effect of combined
operations made by many evidences.ulti-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frame-
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For achieving the situational assessment of multi-aircraft
cooperative attack, the relevant mathematical model is estab-
lished based on the D-S evidence theory as follows.
Firstly, we establish the discernment frame of the fighting
effect H.
LetH ¼ fa; b; hg be the discernment frame of fighting effect
defined in Section 1, where a; b and h denote respectively the
fighting efficacy, inefficacy and uncertainty in the three cases
of single aircraft attack versus one enemy target, multi-
aircraft cooperative attack versus one enemy target, and
multi-aircraft cooperative attack versus multiple enemy
targets.
Secondly, design the basic probability assignment on the
frame of discernment H for our aircraft.
The basic probability assignment of the sensor distance evi-
dence is formulated in the expression Eqs. (1)–(3), which is
depicted in Fig. 1.
-RLðaÞ ¼
azo 0 6 r < lzo
ðajsazoÞr
ljslzo þ azo  lzo
ajsazo
ljslzo lzo 6 r < ljs
ðazjajsÞr
lzjljs þ ajs  ljs
azjajs
lzjljs ljs 6 r < lzj
ðaksazjÞr
lkslzj þ azj  lzj
aksazj
lkslzj lzj 6 r < lks
ðazbaksÞr
lzblks þ aks  lks
azbaks
lzblks lks 6 r < lzb
azb lzb 6 r
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
ð1Þ-RLðbÞ ¼
bzo 0 6 r < lzo
ðbjsbzoÞr
ljslzo þ bzo  lzo
bjsbzo
ljslzo lzo 6 r < ljs
ðbzjbjsÞr
lzjljs þ bjs  ljs
bzjbjs
lzjljs ljs 6 r < lzj
ðbksbzjÞr
lkslzj þ bzj  lzj
bksbzj
lkslzj lzj 6 r < lks
ðbzbbksÞr
lzblks þ bks  lks
bzbbks
lzblks lks 6 r < lzb
bzb lzb 6 r
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
ð2Þ-RLðhÞ ¼ h rP 0 km ð3Þ
where -RL is the basic probability assignment of the sensor dis-
tance (radar length r) evidence, where - denotes that the func-
tion is used for describing aircraft (we also define the function
# for describing enemy target correspondingly). The functionsFig. 1 Basic probability assignment function -RL.
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mapping functions of the fighting effect of the sensor distance
evidence, which establishes the correspondence between the
distance from the aircraft to foe’s target and the sensor detect-
ing ability of our aircraft.
In the expression Eqs. (1)–(3), the other mathematical sym-
bols are depicted in Fig. 1.
As shown in Fig. 1, the unitary fighting effect value of the
synthesis capability (-RLðÞ, the vertical axis of the coordi-
nates, in ½0; 1 without unit) is achieved in the process of sen-
sors when the aircraft detects, tracks and identifies foe’s
target. It depends on the distance (r, the horizontal axis of
the coordinates, with a unit of kilometer) between the aircraft
and foe’s target. -RLðÞ implies how much the sensors’ ability
being enslaved to the distance contributes to the whole attack-
ing action. In Fig. 1, the cures with sign (a; b and h) represent
the validity, invalidity and uncertainty of the fighting effect of
the sensor distance evidence, respectively; the values of the ver-
tical axis parameters (azo; ajs; azj; aks; azb; bzo; bjs; bzj; bks; bzb) and
the horizontal axis parameters (lzo; ljs; lzj; lks; lzb) will be embod-
ied by the capability of the actual sensors.
Analogously, the basic probability assignments of sensor
pitching evidence, sensor azimuth evidence, weapon distance
evidence, weapon pitching evidence and weapon azimuth evi-
dence can also be formulated as -RH;-RW;-ML;-MH and
-MW, respectively.
For enemy target, by adopting the same method, the basic
probability assignments of the sensor distance, sensor pitching
evidence, sensor azimuth evidence, weapon distance evidence,
weapon pitching evidence and weapon azimuth evidence can
be formulated to be #RL; #RH; #RW; #ML; #MH and #MW,
respectively.
Finally, we achieve the evidence synthesizing of the coordi-
nated airfight.
It should be noted that the attacking effect will be different
when the swarm of aircrafts employs different strategies (the
allocations of a set of aircrafts versus a number of foe’s tar-
gets) to attack foe’s group of targets although the positions
between any of aircrafts and each foe’s target are the same.
Therefore, in this paper, the situational assessment is equiv-
alent to calculating the validity -aiðaÞ, invalidity -aiðbÞ and
uncertainty -aiðhÞ of the certain-strategy ai, as well as the
validity #bjðaÞ, invalidity #bjðbÞ and uncertainty #bjðhÞ of the
foe’s certain-strategy bj.
Our certain-strategy may consist of three cases:
(1) One of aircrafts attacks one of given foe’s target.
(2) A set of aircrafts attack cooperatively the given foe’s
target.
(3) None of aircrafts attacks the given foe’s target.
The foe’s certain-strategy is similar to our certain strategy.
The validity of the fighting effect of k aircrafts cooperative
attacking l targets may be acquired by a set of evidence synthe-
sizing processes based on the evidence theory as follows:-aiRtpn ¼ -
ai
RLtpn
 -aiRHtpn  -
ai
RWtpn
ð4Þwhere t ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; l is the serial number of the certain foe’s tar-
get meeting with attack; pn ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ; k is the serial number
of those aircrafts attending the action; n ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . ; kulti-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frame-
4 Z. Yao et al.denotes the number of aircrafts attending the action of coop-
erative attack against the certain foe’s target.
Eq. (4) denotes that the total fighting effect (including
validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the sensor on the air-
craft with the serial number pn in the subscript of -
ai
Rtpn
is
acquired by synthesizing the fighting effect of the sensor dis-
tance evidences -aiRLtpn , the fighting effect of the sensor pitching
evidences -aiRHtpn , and the fighting effect of the sensor azimuth
evidences -aiRWtpn based on the D-S synthesize rules in Sec-
tion 2.1 when one of our certain aircraft pn attacks one of foe’s
certain target t according to our certain strategy ai.
-aiMtpn ¼ -
ai
MLtpn
 -aiMHtpn  -
ai
MWtpn
ð5Þ
The meaning of Eq. (5) is similar to that of Eq. (4). The dif-
ference only lies in the fact that the weapon is described instead
of the sensor.
-aitpn ¼ -
ai
Rtpn
 -aiMtpn ð6Þ
Eq. (6) denotes that the total fighting effect (including
validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of one of the aircrafts with
the serial number pn (-
ai
tpn
) is acquired by synthesizing the total
fighting effect of the sensor evidences -aiRtpn and the total fight-
ing effect of the weapon evidences -aiMtpn based on the D-S syn-
thesize rules in Section 2.1 when one of our certain aircrafts pn
attacks one of foe’s certain target t according to the certain
strategy ai.
-ait ¼ -aitp1  -aitp2  . . . -aitpn ð7Þ
Eq. (7) denotes that the total fighting effect (including
validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of n our aircrafts with
the serial number ðp1; p2; . . . ; pnÞ -ait is acquired by synthesizing
the total fighting effects of all our aircraft with the serial num-
ber ðp1; p2; . . . ; pnÞ cooperatively attacking the same foe’s tar-
get t ð-aitp1 ;-aitp2 ; . . . ;-aitpn Þ based on the D-S synthesize rules in
Section 2.1 when multiple aircrafts cooperatively attack one
certain foe’s target according to our certain strategy ai.
Considering the case that none of our aircraft attacks the
given foe’s target, we form a special rule as follows:
-ait0ðaÞ ¼ 0:299;-ait0ðbÞ ¼ 0:689;-ait0ðhÞ ¼ 0:012
-ait ¼ -aitp0 ¼ -
ai
t0
(
ð8Þ
Eq. (8) denotes that the total fighting effect (validity, inva-
lidity and uncertainty) of the aircraft team is set to be 0.299,
0.689 and 0.012 respectively, when none of our aircraft attack
the certain foe’s target t according to our certain strategy ai.
-ai ¼ -ai1  -ai2  . . . -ait  . . . -ail ð9Þ
Eq. (9) denotes that the total fighting effect (including
validity, invalidity and uncertainty) of the whole of our aircraft
team -ai is acquired by synthesizing the fighting effect of all
aircrafts cooperatively attacking all l foe’s targets with the
serial number ð1; 2; . . . ; t; . . . ; lÞ -ai1 ;-ai2 ; . . . ;-ait ; . . . ;-ail based
on the D-S synthesize rules in Section 2.1 when multiple air-
crafts cooperatively attack the foe’s targets according to our
certain strategy ai.
For enemy target, by adopting the same method, the total
fighting effect (including validity, invalidity and uncertainty)
of the whole of foe’s target group #bj may be also acquiredPlease cite this article in press as: Yao Z et al. Mission decision-making method of m
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aircrafts according to the certain foe’s strategy bj.
3. Formulating mission decision-making based on game theory
For achieving mission decision-making of multi-aircraft coop-
eratively attacking multi-target, the relevant mathematical
model is established based on the game theory as follows:
The game model is set as
G ¼ hN;S1;S2; u1; u2i; N ¼ fn1; n2g
where N is the game members, S1 our strategy set, and S2 the
foe’s strategy set. n1 represents our team that consists of k air-
crafts and n2 represents the foe’s group that consists of l
targets:
S1 ¼ a1; a2; . . . ; a mf g;S2 ¼ b1; b2; . . . ; bnf g
ai ¼ ðW1; d1Þ; ðW2; d2Þ; . . . ; ðWl; dlÞf g

where W1;W2; . . . ;Wl W ¼ fw1;w2; . . . ;wk;£g and we
have
W1 [W2 [ . . . [Wl ¼ W
W1 \W2 \ . . . \Wl ¼£
bj ¼ ðD1;w1Þ; ðD2;w2Þ; . . . ; ðDk;wkÞf g
8><
>:
where D1;D2; . . . ;Dk  D ¼ fd1; d2; . . . ; dl;£g and
D1 [D2 [ . . . [Dk ¼ D
D1 \D2 \ . . . \Dk ¼£

where ai ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; mÞ represents the m strategies of our k
aircrafts cooperatively attacking l foe’s targets, while
bj ðj ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; nÞ the n strategies of l foe’s targets coopera-
tively defending our k aircrafts. One among the parameters
(d1; d2; . . . ; dl) represents the serial number of l foe’s targets;
one among the parameters (w1;w2; . . . ;wk) represents the serial
number of our k aircrafts; £ represents nobody;
ðWt; dtÞ ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; lÞ represents a set of our aircrafts marked
byWt cooperatively attacking the same foe’s target marked by
dt, while ðDt;wtÞ ðt ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; kÞ represents a number of foe’s
targets marked by Dt cooperatively defending our same air-
craft marked by wt.
When our strategy of ai and foe’s strategy of bj are selected
simultaneously, our payment function is set as
u1ðai; bjÞ ¼ aij ¼
-aiðaÞ#bjðbÞ
-aiðbÞ#bjðaÞ ð10Þ
Similarly, the foe’s payment function is set as
u2ðai; bjÞ ¼ bij ¼
-aiðbÞ#bjðaÞ
-aiðaÞ#bjðbÞ ð11Þ
A ¼ ½aij mn and B ¼ ½bij mn are called our payment matrix and
the foe’s payment matrix, respectively.
The Nash equilibrium state of the game model G may be
acquired by the certain computing method based on the matrix
A and B.
Our strategy of ai and foe’s strategy of bj denoted by the
Nash equilibrium state will be used to determine the fighting
action of our aircrafts team and guess the defending action
of foe’s targets group, respectively.ulti-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frame-
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To demonstrate the performance of the proposed methods, the
following part presents the simulation results by using the mis-
sion decision-making algorithms in Sections 2 and 3.
4.1. Scenario
As shown in Fig. 2, a typical scenario is simulated with our
software to evaluate the performance of the proposed mission
decision-making algorithm for multi-aircraft cooperative
attack.
In the scenario, our one team consists of four UCAVs with
the serial number fw1;w2;w3;w4g in the air and one enemy
group consists of three missile positions with the serial number
fd1; d2; d3g and a crucial target with the serial number m4 on
the ground.
In our team, each UCAV has the same sensor detecting and
weapon attacking ability, the flight altitude of 8000–11000 m
(the value is 10000 m for this example) and the flight velocity
of 200–280 m/s (the value is 240 m/s for this example). The
four UCAVs take the form of trapezium (see Fig. 2). In the
trapezium team, the distance between the frontal two UCAVs
is 5–20 km (the value is 5 km for this example) and the distance
between the latter two UCAVs is 10–50 km (the value is 10 km
for this example); the distance between the frontal two UCAVs
and the latter two UCAVs is 2.5–30 km (the value is 2.5 km for
this example).
In enemy group, the three missile positions take the form of
equilateral triangle (see Fig. 2). In the equilateral triangle team,
the distance between any two missile positions is 10–30 km (the
value is 10 km for this example) and the crucial target is
located on the center of equilateral triangle. The distance
between the center of our team and the center of enemy group
is a variable that may be a value from 5 km to 70 km (the value
is 10 km for this example).
The fighting ability of our UCAV depends on the supposi-
tional sensor (SAR radar) and weapon (JDAM bomb). The
ability of enemy missile position is restricted to the supposi-Fig. 2 A typical scenario of SEAD.
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4.2. Game model
The mathematical model used for developing simulation soft-
ware package is established based on the scenario in Section 4.1
and the algorithm designed in Section 3 as follows:
G ¼ hN;S1;S2; u1; u2i;N ¼ fn1; n2g
n1 represents our team consisting of four UCAVs and n2
represents enemy group consisting of three missile positions
and a crucial target. S1 ¼ fa1; a2; . . . ; a12g represents the pri-
mary strategy set of our four UCAVs cooperatively attacking
four foe’s targets (compared with other strategies, these strate-
gies are employed with higher probability of over 50%), where
a1 ¼ ðw1; d1Þ; ðw2; d2Þ; ðw3;m4Þ; ðw4; d3Þf g
a2 ¼ ððw1;w2Þ; d1Þ; ðw3; d2Þ; ðw4;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
a3 ¼ ððw1;w2;w3Þ; d1Þ; ð£; d2Þ; ðw4;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
a4 ¼ ðw1; d1Þ; ððw2;w3Þ; d2Þ; ðw4;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
a5 ¼ ð/; d1Þ; ððw1;w2;w3Þ; d2Þ; ðw4;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
a6 ¼ ðw1; d1Þ; ððw2;w3Þ; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ðw4; d3Þf g
a7 ¼ ððw1;w2Þ; d1Þ; ðw3; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ðw4; d3Þf g
a8 ¼ ððw1;w2;w3Þ; d1Þ; ðw4; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
a9 ¼ ððw1;w2;w3;w4Þ; d1Þ; ð£; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
a10 ¼ ð£; d1Þ; ððw1;w2Þ; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ððw3;w4Þ; d3Þf g
a11 ¼ ð£; d1Þ; ððw1;w2;w3Þ; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ðw4; d3Þf g
a12 ¼ ð£; d1Þ; ððw1;w2;w3;w4Þ; d2Þ; ð£;m4Þ; ð£; d3Þf g
8>>>>>>>>>>>>><
>>>>>>>>>>>>:
where wi ði ¼ 1; 2; 3; 4Þ represent the four UCAVs in our team,
and djðj ¼ 1; 2; 3Þ represent the missile positions in the foe’s
team; m4 represents a foe’s crucial target. The term
fðx; yÞ; zg represents that x and y attack cooperatively z, and
ð£;m4Þ represents none of our aircrafts attack the foe’s target
m4.
The meaning of the strategy ai ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 12Þ is explained
by describing the strategy a4 as follows: a4 represents that our
UCAV w1 attacks foe’s missile position d1, our two UCAVs w2
and w3 attack cooperatively foe’s missile position d2, our
UCAV w4 attacks foe’s crucial target m4, and none of our air-
craft attack foe’s missile position d3.
The character of the strategies a1  a5 is that foe’s missile
positions and crucial target are attacked comparably, while
the character of the strategies a6  a12 is that the action of
attacking foe’s missile positions is prior to the action of attack-
ing foe’s crucial target.
S2 ¼ fb1; b2; . . . ; b6g represents the primary strategy set of
four foe’s targets cooperatively defending our four UCAVs
(compared with other strategies, these strategies are employed
with higher probability of over 50%), where
b1 ¼ ðd1;w1Þ; ðd2;w2Þ; ðd3;w4Þ; ð£;w3Þf g
b2 ¼ ððd1; d2Þ;w1Þ; ðd3;w4Þ; ð£;w2Þ; ð£;w3Þf g
b3 ¼ ððd1; d2; d3Þ;w1Þ; ð£;w2Þ; ð£;w3Þ; ð£;w4Þf g
b4 ¼ ðd1;w1Þ; ðd2;w3Þ; ðd3;w4Þ; ð£;w2Þf g
b5 ¼ ðd1;w1Þ; ððd2; d3Þ;w4Þ; ð£;w2Þ; ð£;w3Þf g
b6 ¼ ððd1; d2; d3Þ;w4Þ; ð£;w1Þ; ð£;w2Þ; ð£;w3Þf g
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Fig. 3 Our No. 4 strategy versus foe’s No. 4 strategy.
6 Z. Yao et al.The meaning of the strategy bj ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 6Þ can be
explained similarly according to the meaning of the strategy
ai ði ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 12Þ.
When our strategy ai and foe’s strategy bj are selected
simultaneously, our payment function is set as
u1ðai; bjÞ ¼ aij ¼
-aiðaÞ#bjðbÞ
-aiðbÞ#bjðaÞ
i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 12; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 6
8><
>: ð12Þ
Similarly, the foe’s payment function is set as follows:
u2ðai; bjÞ ¼ bij ¼
-aiðbÞ#bjðaÞ
-aiðaÞ#bjðbÞ
i ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 12; j ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; 6
8><
>: ð13Þ
Actually, Eqs. (12) and (13) are embodiment of Eqs. (10)
and (11) after our strategies ai and foe’s strategies bj are
confirmed.
4.3. Results
The simulation examples consist of a set of computing pro-
cesses as follows:
Firstly, when ai and bj mentioned in Section 4.2 are selected
simultaneously, the actual capability of the suppositional sensor
(SAR radar) andweapon (JDAMbomb) aboard theUCAVand
the suppositional sensor (track homing radar) and weapon
(short ground to air missile) in the missile position mentioned
in Section 4.1 may be transformed respectively into the unitary
fighting effect values (-aiRLðÞ;-aiRHðÞ;-aiRWðÞ;-aiMLðÞ;-aiMHðÞ
and -aiMWðÞ; #bjRLðÞ; #bjRHðÞ; #bjRWðÞ; #bjMLðÞ; #bjMHðÞ and #bjMWðÞ)
by adopting the algorithm designed in Section 2.
Secondly, the total fighting effect (including validity, inva-
lidity and uncertainty) of the whole of our aircrafts team
-aiðÞ and the total fighting effect of the whole of foe’s target
group #bjðÞ, mentioned in Eqs. (12) and (13) in Section 4.2,
can be acquired by a set of computing processes based on
the algorithms designed in Section 2 and the unitary fighting
effect values acquired by the above computing.
As a result, our payment matrix A ¼ ½aijmn and foe’s pay-
ment matrix B ¼ ½bij mn mentioned in Section 3 can be
acquired by computing Eqs. (12) and (13) and shown as
follows:Please cite this article in press as: Yao Z et al. Mission decision-making method of m
work, Chin J Aeronaut (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2016.09.006Finally, the Nash equilibrium state of the game model G
mentioned in Section 4.2 may be acquired by solving the
matrix A and B based on the Scarf arithmetic in the Gambit
software package.
In the situation of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking
multi-target enacted in Section 4.1, the Nash equilibrium state
of the game model G is that our strategy a4 and foe’s strategy
b4 are selected simultaneously.
Our strategy of a4 and foe’s strategy of b4 will be regarded
as the mission decision-making of our team antagonizing foe’s
group (Fig. 3) and will be used to determine the fighting action
of our aircraft team and to guess the defending action of foe’s
target group, respectively.
5. Analysis
For validating the rationality of the studying results in Sec-
tion 4, on the one hand, the other two strategies a5 and a6
are selected to antagonize foe’s strategy b4, because the fight-
ing effect difference between the two strategies and strategy
a4 is the least (Figs. 4 and 5); on the other hand, the other
two strategies b2 and b6 are selected to antagonize our strategy
a4, because the fighting effect difference between the two
strategies and strategy b4 is the least (Figs. 6 and 7).
The results of comparing the fighting effect of our strategies
(a4; a5 and a6) and the fighting effect of foe’s strategy b4 areulti-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frame-
Fig. 4 Our No. 5 strategy versus foe’s No. 4 strategy.
Fig. 5 Our No. 6 strategy versus foe’s No. 4 strategy.
Fig. 6 Foe’s No. 2 strategy versus our No. 4 strategy.
Fig. 7 Foe’s No. 6 strategy versus our No. 4 strategy.
Table 1 Fighting effect comparison of our strategies.
Item a b h
-a4 ðÞ 0.988 0.011 0.001
#b2 ðÞ 0.669 0.330 0.001
#b4 ðÞ 0.869 0.130 0.001
#b6 ðÞ 0.467 0.532 0.001
Table 2 Fighting effect comparison of foe’s strategies.
Item a b h
#b4 ðÞ 0.869 0.130 0.001
-a4 ðÞ 0.988 0.011 0.001
-a5 ðÞ 0.947 0.052 0.001
-a6 ðÞ 0.940 0.059 0.001
Mission decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic framework 7shown in Table 1, while the results of comparing the fighting
effect of foe’s strategies (b2; b4 and b6) and the fighting effect
of our strategy a4 are shown in Table 2.Please cite this article in press as: Yao Z et al. Mission decision-making method of m
work, Chin J Aeronaut (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2016.09.006Table 1 indicates that the fighting effects (validity) of our
strategies a4; a5 and a6 are -a4ðaÞ ¼ 0:988;-a5ðaÞ ¼ 0:947 and
-a6ðaÞ ¼ 0:940, respectively. As a result, it can be explained
why our strategy a4 is regarded as the fighting action that
our aircraft team should carry out when our team is antagoniz-
ing foe’s group in the case described in Section 4.1.
Similarly, Table 2 indicates that the fighting effects (valid-
ity) of foe’s strategies b2; b4 and b6 are
#b2ðaÞ ¼ 0:669; #b4ðaÞ ¼ 0:869 and #b6ðaÞ ¼ 0:467, respec-
tively. As a result, it can also be explained why foe’s strategy
b4 is regarded as the defending action that foe’s target group
may carry out in the same case.
To further evaluate the results of the proposed mission
decision-making method in Section 4.3, we study the situation
analyzing process of our equilibrium strategy a4 in comparison
with the strategy a5. Tables 3 and 4 list the fighting effect val-
ues which are obtained by using Eqs. (6)–(9) in Section 2.
According to the description in Section 4.3, the equilibrium
results of the game model depend on our payment matrix A
and the foe’s payment matrix B. Each element in the payment
matrix A and matrix B can be computed by the paymentulti-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frame-
Table 3 Situation analyzing process of our No. 4 strategy.
Item a b h
-a4R11 ðÞ 0.655 0.082 0.263
-a4M11 ðÞ 0.206 0.659 0.135
-a411ðÞ 0.503 0.432 0.065
-a41 ðÞ 0.503 0.432 0.065
-a4R22 ðÞ 0.670 0.080 0.250
-a4M22 ðÞ 0.563 0.182 0.255
-a422ðÞ 0.827 0.096 0.077
-a4R23 ðÞ 0.670 0.080 0.250
-a4M23 ðÞ 0.563 0.182 0.255
-a423ðÞ 0.827 0.096 0.077
-a42 ðÞ 0.964 0.028 0.006
-a430ðÞ 0.299 0.689 0.012
-a43 ðÞ 0.299 0.689 0.012
-a4R44 ðÞ 0.701 0.062 0.237
-a4M44 ðÞ 0.572 0.188 0.240
-a444ðÞ 0.846 0.085 0.069
-a44 ðÞ 0.846 0.085 0.069
-a4 ðÞ 0.988 0.011 0.001
Table 4 Situation analyzing process of our No. 5 strategy.
Item a b h
-a510ðÞ 0.299 0.689 0.012
-a51 ðÞ 0.299 0.689 0.012
-a5R21 ðÞ 0.263 0.319 0.418
-a5M21 ðÞ 0.151 0.485 0.364
-a521ðÞ 0.241 0.575 0.184
-a5R22 ðÞ 0.670 0.080 0.250
-a5M22 ðÞ 0.563 0.182 0.255
-a522ðÞ 0.827 0.096 0.077
-a5R23 ðÞ 0.670 0.080 0.250
-a5M23 ðÞ 0.563 0.182 0.255
-a523ðÞ 0.827 0.096 0.077
-a52 ðÞ 0.938 0.059 0.003
-a530ðÞ 0.299 0.689 0.012
-a53 ðÞ 0.299 0.689 0.012
-a5R44 ðÞ 0.701 0.062 0.237
-a5M44 ðÞ 0.572 0.188 0.240
-a544ðÞ 0.846 0.085 0.069
-a54 ðÞ 0.846 0.085 0.069
-a5 ðÞ 0.947 0.052 0.001
Table 5 Situation analyzing process of our aircraft 1 attack-
ing foe’s missile position 2.
Item a b h
-a5RL21 ðÞ 0.725 0.265 0.010
-a5RH21 ðÞ 0.100 0.890 0.010
-a5RW21 ðÞ 0.744 0.246 0.010
-a5R21 ðÞ 0.263 0.319 0.418
-a5ML21 ðÞ 0.681 0.309 0.010
-a5MH21 ðÞ 0.100 0.890 0.010
-a5MW21 ðÞ 0.100 0.890 0.010
-a5M21 ðÞ 0.152 0.485 0.363
-a521ðÞ 0.241 0.575 0.184
8 Z. Yao et al.functions Eqs. (12) and (13). Therefore, the items
-a4ðaÞ;-a4ðbÞ;-a5ðaÞ and -a5ðbÞ in the payment functions
Eqs. (12) and (13) mainly determine that our equilibrium strat-
egy a4 has better results than the strategy a5.
Table 3 presents the obtaining process of the items -a4ðaÞ
and -a4ðbÞ, which shows the quantitative analysis and comput-
ing process of the combat situation that our multiple aircrafts
cooperatively attack multi-object with strategy a4. Similarly,
Table 4 presents the obtaining process of the items -a5ðaÞ
and -a5ðbÞ, which shows the quantitative analysis and comput-
ing process of the combat situation that our multiple aircrafts
cooperatively attack multi-object with strategy a5.Please cite this article in press as: Yao Z et al. Mission decision-making method of m
work, Chin J Aeronaut (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2016.09.006In the following part, the numerical results in Tables 3 and
4 are analyzed to obtain the underlying reason why strategy a4
has better results than strategy a5.
Comparing the data in Tables 3 and 4, we can see that the
fighting effects against the foe’s missile position 3 and the high
value target m4 are the same in strategy a4 and strategy a5. The
distinctions are delineated as follows:
(1) In strategy a4, our aircraft 1 is deployed to attack the
foe’s missile position 1, and the computed fighting effect
value -a41 ðaÞ is 0.503; in strategy a5, our aircraft is not
deployed to attack the foe’s missile position 1, and
according to Eq. (8), the computed fighting effect value
-a51 ðaÞ is 0.299.
(2) In strategy a4, our aircraft 2 and aircraft 3 are deployed
to cooperatively attack the foe’s missile position 2, and
the computed fighting effect value -a42 ðaÞ is 0.964; in
strategy a5, our aircraft 1, aircraft 2 and aircraft 3 are
deployed to cooperatively attack the foe’s missile posi-
tion 2, and the computed fighting effect value -a52 ðaÞ is
0.938.
In light of the above reasons (1) and (2), the fighting effect
value -a4ðaÞ (0.988) with strategy a4 is larger than the fighting
effect value -a5ðaÞ (0.947) with strategy a5.
In strategy a5, why does the fighting effect value decrease
when our aircraft 1 is added to attack foe’s missile position
2? In Table 4, it can be found that the fighting effect value
-a521ðaÞ is 0.241 when our aircraft 1 is deployed to attack foe’s
missile position 2. In other words, the effectiveness turns bad
when our aircraft 1 is added to attack foe’s missile position
2, which has a negative impact on the original strategy of
our aircraft 2 and aircraft 3 cooperatively attacking foe’s mis-
sile position 2. Therefore, the overall fighting effect value
against foe’s missile position 2 decreases when our aircraft 1
is added. It also demonstrates that ‘‘more is not necessarily
better”.
In the scenario of Section 4.1, the horizontal distance
between our aircraft 1 and the foe’s missile position 2 is
4582 m. The pitch angle and azimuth angle are 65.8 and
57.3, respectively.
To analyze the essential reason why our aircraft 1 should
not be deployed to attack foe’s missile position 2, the situation
analysis is performed according to Eqs. (4)–(6). The detailed
results are listed in Table 5.ulti-aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-target based on game theoretic frame-
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(SAR radar) and weapon (JDAM bomb), the horizontal dis-
tance between our aircraft 1 and foe’s missile position 2 is
proper, which supports the attack missions. In Table 5, it
can be found that both the fighting effect value with the sensor
-a5RL21ðaÞ (0.725) and that with the weapon -a5ML21ðaÞ (0.681) are
larger than 0.5.
The azimuth angle between our aircraft 1 and foe’s missile
position 2 (57.3> 45) has a large difference with the desired
direction. Because the lateral detection is the main direction
for the sensor (SAR radar), a large azimuth angle is near the
main detection direction, which can improve the sensor perfor-
mance and better support the attack mission. In Table 5, it can
be found that the fighting effect value with the sensor azimuth
angle -a5RW21ðaÞ (0.744) is larger than 0.5. The weapon (JDAM
bomb) is the unpowered gliding weapon, and therefore, the
yaw control of the weapon cannot be performed before its
landing if the azimuth angle is too large at some given altitude
(i.e., given gliding time). The hit probability may also decrease,
which cannot support the attack mission. Table 5 shows that
the fighting effect value with the weapon azimuth angle
-a5MW21ðaÞ (0.100) is smaller than 0.5.
The pitch angle (65.8> 45) between our aircraft 1 and
foe’s missile position 2 has a large overlook range. The offset
of the sensor (SAR radar) antenna depends on the inner state
of aircraft and has a limited range. Therefore, it is hard to
achieve a large pitch angle, which blocks the performance of
the sensor and the attack mission. In Table 5, it can be found
that the fighting effect value with the sensor pitch angle
-a5RH21ðaÞ (0.100) is smaller than 0.5. The weapon (JDAM
bomb) is the unpowered gliding weapon, and therefore, the
flight path must be adjusted if the relative pitch angle is too
large at some given altitude (i.e., given gliding time). Other-
wise, the weapon cannot hit the target and support the attack
mission before its landing. Table 5 shows that the fighting
effect value with the weapon azimuth angle -a5MH21ðaÞ (0.100)
is smaller than 0.5.
In a word, the fighting effect value with the sensor pitch
angle does not support the attack mission (-a5RH21ðaÞ ¼ 0:100),
which prevents the sensor evidence from supporting the attack
mission (-a5R21ðaÞ ¼ 0:263). In addition, both the fighting effect
value with the weapon pitch angle and that with azimuth angle
do not support the attack mission (-a5MH21ðaÞ ¼ -a5MW21ðaÞ ¼
0:100), and therefore, the weapon evidence cannot support
the attack mission (-a5M21ðaÞ ¼ 0:152).
Under the condition that both the sensor and weapon evi-
dences do not support the attack mission, it is easy to conclude
that, in the air combat scenario, our aircraft 1 should not be
deployed to attack foe’s missile position 2.6. Conclusions
By using the above numerical simulations, the proposed mis-
sion decision-making method of multi-aircraft cooperatively
attacking multi-object based on situation analysis can be con-
cluded as follows:
(1) The general rule of the real combat process can be
demonstrated on the basis of the equilibrium results,
which are obtained by selecting the horizontal distance,Please cite this article in press as: Yao Z et al. Mission decision-making method of m
work, Chin J Aeronaut (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cja.2016.09.006pitch angle, and azimuth angle between our aircraft and
foe’s target, determining the fighting effect values of the
sensor and weapon, and performing the quantitative
analysis of the combat situation that our multiple air-
crafts cooperatively attack multi-object by D-S evidence
theory.
(2) Based on the complete information static game theory,
the mission decision-making model of the multi-
aircraft cooperatively attacking multi-object is estab-
lished. The payment function can also be constructed,
which realizes the parameter transfer between the quan-
titative analysis of air combat situation and optimal mis-
sion decision-making. The equilibrium results of the
game model are computed by using the static dual
matrix game algorithm. The air combat strategy can
be determined by the Nash equilibrium solution which
reflects the real air combat situation and antagonizing
ability between two sides.
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